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ABSTRACT
This paper evaluates the impact of a large macroeconomic shock on poverty. In partic-
ular, we use longitudinal data from the European Survey on Income and Living Conditions
(EU-SILC) comprising almost two million individuals from 29 European countries in order
to quantify changes in poverty transition patterns caused by the 2007 global financial crisis.
Because the crisis was largely unforeseeable, it provides an appealing natural experiment
allowing us to isolate the causal effect of a substantial macroeconomic shock on poverty.
Employing semiparametric mixed discrete time survival analysis, we find that conditional
poverty entry hazards increased temporarily by 13.4% during the crisis, while post-crisis
they are estimated to be 15.7% lower than before. Not only entry hazards have decreased,
also conditional exit hazards are estimated to be 31.4% lower post-crisis compared to be-
fore. Ceteris paribus, the crisis therefore has made it more difficult to slip into poverty, yet
those who were already poor face substantially lower prospects to escape. Exploring deter-
minants of poverty transitions, we find that being retired, having a permanent job, owning
one’s dwelling instead of renting it, age, marital status, and household size are the most
important protective factors against poverty. Finally, we show that mostly a housing cost
overburden seems to be responsible for the persistence of poverty.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite sustained economic growth in recent years, 23.7% of the European population are still
at risk of poverty today (Eurostat 2017a). Undoubtedly, this is a matter of serious concern, for
those affected directly and the society alike. In order to fight poverty effectively, detailed knowl-
edge of underlying mechanisms which trigger transitions into and out of poverty is essential.
Building on the seminal work by Bane & Ellwood (1986), the analysis of poverty transitions
has received a great deal of attention in the economic literature. A common practice therein
is to distinguish individual socioeconomic endowments from certain trigger events as potential
determinants of poverty transitions. The former include gender, age, race, employment, and
consumption which—along with life events such as becoming unemployed or physically dis-
abled (e.g., McKernan & Ratcliffe 2005, Polin & Raitano 2014)—are typically found to explain
a sizable part of the variation in individuals’ susceptibility to poverty (Jenkins 2011),1 Large
macroeconomic shocks, however, have largely been ignored in this literature, although they
have indeed the potential to alter poverty patterns substantially (Jenkins et al. 2012).
In this paper we aim to fill this gap. Using microlevel longitudinal data on almost two
million individuals from 29 European countries drawn from the European Survey on Income
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC), we employ semiparametric mixed discrete time survival
models to analyze how poverty transition patterns have changed due to the global financial
crisis between 2007 and 2009. Because the crisis was largely unforeseeable, it provides an
appealing natural experiment to analyze the impact of a substantial macroeconomic shock on
poverty. We contribute to the literature in several important ways: Most importantly, we are
the first to empirically isolate the causal effect of a large macroeconomic shock on individual
poverty outcomes in a multivariate regression framework using cross-country microlevel data.
Second, we introduce a variant of a mixed discrete time survival estimator to the literature which
deals with unobserved heterogeneity and right-censoring in a very flexible manner. Unlike
currently used econometric approaches which usually model entry and exit probabilities jointly,
our estimator suits the underlying poverty duration process relatively better (see section II for
more information). Third, we use a large and comprehensive dataset comprising very detailed
information on socioeconomic, demographic, and health characteristics for almost two million
individuals spread across Europe, which allows us to carry out a very thorough and extensive
analysis of potential mechanisms underlying poverty transitions. To our knowledge, we are also
1Most evidence on determinants of poverty transitions comes from the United States (e.g., Eller 1996, McKer-
nan & Ratcliffe 2002, Naifeh 1998, Rank & Hirschl 1999, 2001, Ribar & Hamrick 2003). Single country analyses
are available, amongst many others, for Australia (Buddelmeyer & Verick 2008), Canada (e.g., Finnie 2000), Spain
(e.g., Cantó 2003), Sweden (e.g., Fritzell & Henz 2001), Turkey (S¸eker & Dayıog˘lu 2015, S¸eker & Jenkins 2015),
or the United Kingdom (e.g., Jenkins et al. 2001, Jenkins & Van Kerm 2011). For developing countries, Baulch
& Hoddinott (2000) provide an excellent survey on most of the earlier evidence. Cross-country analyses include
Barbieri & Bozzon (2016), Callens & Croux (2009), Polin & Raitano (2014), Jenkins & Van Kerm (2011), Jenkins
& Van Kerm (2014) or Van Kerm & Alperin (2013).
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the first to incorporate the most recent EU-SILC wave into a poverty analysis.
The available literature considering the impact of the 2007 crisis on poverty consists almost
exclusively of studies relying on aggregate data. Examples include Gábos et al. (2015), who
evaluate the effect of employment on aggregate poverty measures and allow for differential
employment effects achieved by interacting their employment measure with crisis dummies,
Duiella & Turrini (2014) who use output, employment, social expenditures, and several other
macro aggregates to explain an at-risk-of-poverty measure in multivariate linear regressions
including also a crisis dummy, or Kaplanoglou & Rapanos (forthcoming) who use a more nar-
rative approach to argue how austerity measures conducted during the crisis in Greece have
altered poverty patterns. Apart from using aggregate data, none of these papers accounts for
fundamental endogeneity problems associated with poverty, for example when unobserved third
variables determine both poverty as well as the macroeconomic aggregate itself, or when the
direction of causality is unclear.
In their influential 2012 book titled “The Great Recession and the Distribution of House-
hold Income,” Jenkins, Brandolini, Micklewright & Nolan consider poverty as an important
response to the financial crisis as well. Their empirical focus, however, lies more on single-
country descriptive analyses rather than a comprehensive multivariate cross-country approach.
Furthermore, indirect evidence for the effect of macroeconomic shocks on the poor can also
be found in studies incorporating measures of GDP or aggregate employment in their analy-
ses of poverty dynamics, both on the aggregate level (e.g. Cutler et al. 1991, Fallon & Lucas
2002) as well as on the individual level (e.g., Callens & Croux 2009, Jäntti & Jenkins 2010,
McKernan & Ratcliffe 2005). Most of these studies document a positive correlation, yet causal
claims are difficult to make for reasons discussed above. Another related strand of the literature
we also contribute to considers state dependency of poverty (e.g., Biewen 2009, Cappellari &
Jenkins 2002, 2004, 2008, Jenkins & Van Kerm 2011), since our framework allows us to look
specifically at the influence of past on current poverty outcomes.
We find that poverty patterns have changed significantly due to the crisis: Before the crisis,
the unconditional probability to enter poverty was comparably high at 4.4%. During the crisis,
the conditional entry rate increased by around 13.4% (which corresponds to an increase from
4.4% to roughly 5% in terms of the average exit rate), while the exit rate decreased by 6.5%.
After the crisis, poverty entry patterns converge back to pre-crisis figures: The conditional
entry hazard eventually becomes even 15.7% lower than before the crisis. In terms of the
unconditional average yearly entry rate of 3.61%, this corresponds to a rather small change by
0.6 percentage points to around 3%. A quite substantial effect, however, is found for exit rates
of people entering poverty post-crisis: They are estimated to be 31.4% lower than before, which
corresponds to a decrease from 30.6% to 21% in terms of the average exit rate.
Thus, the financial crisis has had a sizable impact on poverty dynamics across Europe: Al-
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though fewer people become poor, it has also become increasingly difficult to escape poverty
for those who indeed are poor post-crisis. Those sliding into poverty after the crisis have certain
characteristics that make them seemingly less vulnerable to poverty (in terms of their socioeco-
nomic and demographic background; they are, e.g., more likely to have a permanent job, better
educated, and less likely to have physical limitations) compared to those entering pre-crisis,
so the fact that besides entry hazards also conditional exit hazards decrease post-crisis needs
further investigation. There are two possible explanations: Either the crisis caused a substantial
disruption to the system which makes it relatively more difficult to exit poverty despite having
more favorable socioeconomic endowments, or we capture a compositional change in the pop-
ulation of poor which is not covered by our arsenal of covariates. In Section V, we provide an
extensive discussion why we are strongly in favor of the former explanation.
After quantifying the changes in poverty transitions induced by the financial crisis, we an-
alyze patricular demographic and socioeconomic determinants of entry and exit rates, such as
gender, age, marital status, education, employment, or specific household and regional char-
acteristics. We find that having a permanent job, having physical limitations, being widowed,
having tertiary education and the number of children in the household have the biggest impact
on both entry hazards (negatively) and exit hazards (positively). Finally, we use panel logit fixed
effects regressions to determine potential mechanisms explaining these structural changes we
detect. It turns out that the financial burden due to housing cost increased substantially during
the crisis.
II. METHODOLOGY
II.1. Discrete-time survival analysis
We employ survival analysis in order to empirically analyze transitions into and out of poverty.
In this section we develop a discrete time mixed proportional hazards model (Kalbfleisch &
Prentice 1973, Willett & Singer 1995) which we augment by a random frailty term in order to
account for unobserved heterogeneity between individuals and allow for a fully nonparametric
baseline hazard (see, e.g., Scheike & Jensen 1997, Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2001, or Grilli 2005).
Denote a spell (either poverty or non-poverty, depending on the question at hand) by j, and note
that each individual i= 1, . . . ,N may have up to Ji different spells, where J =maxi{Ji} denotes
the maximum number of spells experienced by any individual in the population. For each spell
j, survival time is denoted by Tj.
Although the process underlying Tj is in fact continuous, the nature of our data requires dis-
crete time modeling. In fact, rather than observing exact dates of poverty onset and offset, we
only have yearly information on whether an individual’s income was below the poverty thresh-
old. Thus, survival times are grouped with mass points located at the respective survey dates.
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Consequently, we assume that T is discrete and partitioned into kj = 1, . . . ,K ji disjoint periods
(0, t1j],(t1j, t2j], . . . ,(tk−1, j, tkj], . . . ,(tK−1, j, tK j] with kj = (tk−1, j, tkj] denoting the kth period of
spell j, K j = maxi{K ji} being the maximum number of periods experienced by any individual
in spell j, and K = max j{K j} being the maximum number of periods experienced by any in-
dividual in any spell. Note that period kj begins immediately after tk−1, j and ends exactly at
tkj.
Each spell ends with the experience of a target event (either entry into or exit out of poverty,
again depending on the question at hand). Define a binary random variable Y whose values
ykji ∈ {0,1} indicate whether individual i’s spell j ends within period k. If ykji = 0 for all
periods in spell j, the spell is right-censored. When looking at exit rates, T is in fact time in
poverty, while ykji takes on the value one if i exits poverty in period k. Considering entry rates,
T in turn is time spent outside poverty, and ykji is onset of poverty. The hazard function is
generally given by
λ ji(k) = Pr(Tj = k |Tj ≥ k) =
Sji(k−1)−Sji(k)
Sji(k−1)
, (1)
where Sji = Pr(Tj > k) is the survivor function (i.e., the probability of surviving past period k
in spell j). The hazard function therefore reflects the probability that individual i’s spell j is
terminated in period k, conditional on surviving until the beginning of k.
We proceed by modeling the conditional hazard function by means of a generalized linear
mixed model (GLMM) implementing a complementary log-log (cloglog) link and additive time-
specific intercepts allowing for a fully nonparametric specification of the baseline hazard (Grilli
2005, Rabe-Hesketh et al. 2001). Formally, we can write the model as
log{− log[1−λ ji(k |ck,xkji,ηi)]}=
K
∑
k=1
δk ·dk+
J
∑
j=2
ξ j · z j+ c
′
kα +x
′
kjiβ +ηi
with ηi |d,z,ck,xkji ∼ N(0,σ
2
η),
(2)
or, adopting a more compact notation,
cloglog[λ ji(k |ck,xkji,ηi)] = d
′δ + z′ξ + c′kα +x
′
kjiβ +ηi, (3)
where d = (d1, . . . ,dK)
′ is a K-dimensional column vector of period indicators which captures
the baseline hazard, z=(z2, . . . ,zJ)
′ is a J-dimensional column vector of spell indicators shifting
the baseline hazard,2 ck is a vector of dummy variables indicating whether period k is measured
before, during, or after the crisis (see section III for more details on the specification of our
crisis dummies), xkji is a vector of explanatory variables (a detailed overview on all variables
2We omit the first spell of each individual.
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we include is also given in section III), and ηi is a random frailty term for which we assume
a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ2η . The frailty term captures unobserved
heterogeneity by allowing each individual to have its own hazard function.3
The literature has identified one measure which is especially important to explain poverty
dynamics, namely, considering exit rates, time already spent in poverty, or analogously, time
spent outside poverty when considering entry rates. A majority of studies (see, e.g., S¸eker &
Dayıog˘lu 2015), for example, stratify spells simply in different spell length categories (e.g.,
already one year in poverty, already two years in poverty, etc.) and then calculate event prob-
abilities separately for each of these categories. The problem with this approach is that it does
not take into account right-censoring, so typically exit probabilities of either one or zero are
assumed for right-censored observations. Consequently, this leads to an underestimation in the
former or to an overestimation of exit rates in the latter case (the same notion in reverse order
applies to entry rates). In our model, the vector product d′δ specifically takes into account the
spell duration by shifting the baseline hazard upwards or downwards depending on how long
people have already been at risk before. Additionally, right-censoring is accounted for by the
inherent mechanics of the duration model.
Note that the model is called ‘mixed’ because we allow for the occurrence of multiple spells
per individual. Earlier contributions (notably Bane & Ellwood 1986, but also more recent papers
such as S¸eker & Dayıog˘lu 2015) ignore these cases and keep only the first spell of each indi-
vidual. This approach has been criticized because neglecting people falling back into poverty
within a short time-frame after escaping may lead to an underestimation of poverty persistence
(Stevens 1999). In our framework, we keep multiple spells per individual and allow each further
spell Ji ≥ 1 to have its own baseline hazard (this is captured by the vector product z
′ξ ).
Estimating equation (2) yields coefficients (δˆ1, . . . , δˆK) of the cloglog-transformed baseline
hazards. Coefficients (ξˆ2, . . . , ξˆJ), as mentioned above, indicate how the hazard profile is verti-
cally offset between the first spell j= 1 and each subsequent spell j= 2, . . . ,J (Willett & Singer
1995). The variance of the frailty term σ2η is a free parameter, and its estimate σˆ
2
η can be used
to calculate the intraclass correlation coefficient
ρˆ =
σˆ2η
σˆ2η + σˆ
2
ε
, (4)
which is the proportion of the total variance explained by between-individual variance (Snijders
& Bosker 2011). Generally we report our estimated coefficients in exponentiated form, which
allows us to interpret them as hazard ratios—that is, the risk of experiencing the target event in
period k conditional on not having experienced the event until the beginning of k.
Using time-specific constants for the baseline hazard, the model in equation (2) is equivalent
3To be more precise, equation (2) is a proportional hazards model, so the shape of the hazard function is
assumed to be the same across individuals, but is shifted up and down by the frailty term ηi.
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to the semiparametric Cox proportional hazards regression in continuous time (Kalbfleisch &
Prentice 1973). We fit equation (2) via Maximum Likelihood, where the marginal log-likelihood
function we seek to maximize reads
l(β ) =
n
∑
i=1
log
(∫ Ki j
∏
k=1
Ji
∏
j=1
λ ji(k)
ykji [1−λ ji(k)]
1−ykji
)
dηi, (5)
(Tutz & Schmid 2016) which is approximated using a 15-point adaptive Gaussian-Hermite
quadrature as suggested by Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal (2008). Inference is based on analytic
individual-level clustered standard errors.
Note that employing discrete time survival estimators is not new in the poverty literature.
A similar approach to modeling poverty transitions via a correlated-risks-type discrete time
survival estimator with jointly distributed unobserved heterogeneity terms was introduced by
Stevens (1999), and has frequently been used since then (e.g., Biewen 2006, Devicienti 2011,
Fertig & Tamm 2010, Jenkins 2011, Kyzyma 2014). However, this estimator is only feasible
for intrinsically discrete time data—in case observed survival times are grouped yet generated
through a continuous time process, Jenkins (2005) shows that hazard rates cannot be identified
using these methods, whereas the complementary log-log link we use in our model suits this
type of data generating process especially well (Grilli 2005, Willett & Singer 1995).
II.2. Panel fixed effects logit models
In order to estimate poverty transitions in section IV.2 as well as certain binary outcome models
in section IV.6, we additionally use conditional fixed effects logit models (Wooldridge 2010,
pp. 621). These models have the advantage of partialling out all observable and unobservable
time-invariant factors which may bias our estimates. This is, however, one of the reasons why
we refrain from using conditional fixed effects models in our main analysis, since they do not
allow us to identify effects of important time-invariant observables such as gender or education
(more importantly, they do not account for right-censoring, which is an important challenge we
have to deal with in our context). The conditional logit estimator can be formulated as
Pr(ykji = 1 |ck,xkji,ϑi) = Λ(ck+x
′
kjiβ +ϑi) (6)
where Λ(·) is the logistic function and ϑi is a set of individual-level fixed effects. For details on
estimation and inference we refer the reader to (Wooldridge 2010, pp. 621).
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III. DATA
We use longitudinal survey data from the European Union Statistics on Income and Living Con-
ditions (EU-SILC). Our database covers 1,992,834 individuals aged 16 or older from 793,491
private households in 29 European countries observed between 2004 to 2014. EU-SILC is de-
signed as a four-year rotational panel, thus in each wave a new set of individuals is introduced
which is then observed annually up to four years. Notable exceptions are Norway and France
where individuals are observed up to 8 and 9 years, respectively. In total, we therefore have
5,592,297 observations.
Our main variable of interest is poverty status at the individual level. According to stan-
dard definitions (Aristei & Perugini 2015), we set the poverty threshold at 60% of the national
median equivalized disposable household income. In order to calculate the equivalized dispos-
able household income, we use the OECD-modified equivalence scale (OECD 2013).4 The
reference period for income data is generally a fixed 12-month time frame which is usually the
previous calendar year before the survey data collection was carried out. Exceptions include the
United Kingdom and Ireland, where the income reference period is defined as the current year
and the last twelve months prior to the interview, respectively.
— Table A.1 about here —
In our regressions we control for gender, binary variables indicating whether the individual
has a permanent job, is retired, has a chronic disease or a physical limitation, and whether she
owns her dwelling instead of renting it. On the individual level, we control additionally for
age, marital status, occupation (grouped into high and low skill level white and blue collar jobs
according to ISCO-88 codes), and education. On the household level, we control for equivalized
household size, the number of children in the household, a binary variable indicating whether
the household resides in a densely populated area, and the logarithm of imputed rent,5 interacted
with a dummy indicating whether the individual owns the dwelling. On the country-level, we
control for the logarithm of GDP and unemployment rate. Following Aristei & Perugini (2015),
we additionally classify countries into six groups which ought to capture a certain degree of
homogeneity with respect to socioeconomic policies and institutions (see Table A.1) and include
dummy variables for each group in our estimations.
— Table A.2 about here —
4The OECD-modified weighting scheme assigns a weight of 1 to the first adult in the household, a weight of
0.5 to each additional adult member, and a weight of 0.3 to each child (OECD 2013).
5Imputed rent refers to an imputed value of rent which is available for every type of dwelling and also house-
hold that do not report a subjective rent themselves. For more information see the Eurostat operation 2013 guide-
lines under http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/publications/collections/manuals-and-guidelines.
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Summary statistics for variables measured on the individual and household-level are pro-
vided in Table A.2. Overall, individuals at risk of entering poverty post-crisis (columns 1 to 3)
have less favorable characteristics compared to individuals at risk of entering before or during
the crisis: They are more likely to have chronic diseases or being physically limited, they are
much less likely to own their dwelling instead of renting it, and they are on average older—
all these characteristics have been shown to increase poverty risk in earlier studies (Barbieri
& Bozzon 2016, Buddelmeyer & Verick 2008, Callens & Croux 2009). Individuals who are
poor after the crisis (columns 4 to 6), on the contrary, have more favorable characteristics com-
pared to the pre-crisis population of poor: They are more likely to hold a permanent job, are
more likely to be retired, are less likely to have a physical limitation, are on average younger
and better educated. Those who actually enter poverty after the crisis also have more favorable
characteristics than those entering before, while differences between those who exit before and
those who exit after the crisis are largely ambiguous. In section IV.1 we elaborate on hypotheses
we draw in terms of entry and exit rates given the compositional characteristics of the different
subpopulations discussed here.
Besides obvious shortcomings most income surveys suffer from, such as measurement error
or sample attrition,6 poverty analysis based on EU-SILC data is further impeded because (1)
poverty status can only be assessed at an annual basis, and because (2) the four-year time frame
is rather short and leads to a large number of censored poverty as well as non-poverty spells.
Recall that all countries besides Norway and France have implemented a four-year rotational
structure. Thus, all individuals who were poor in period k4 have right-censored poverty spells
by construction, and those non-poor in k4 have right-censored non-poverty spells.
In section II, we mentioned that coefficients (δˆ1, δˆ2, δˆ3) have an interesting interpretation,
because they represent the estimated cloglog-transformed baseline hazard for different spell du-
rations (i.e., time already in the risk set). Due to right-censoring, we are only able to estimate
these coefficients corresponding to periods k1, k2, and k3. Every spell whose duration exceeds
three years, Tj ≥ 3, is right-censored by construction (except for spells of individuals residing
in Norway or France, because of the different rotational structure), thus we do not have enough
information to identify the hazard probabilities represented by parameters δˆ3, δˆ4, ... which cor-
respond to these periods. The same notion applies to the number of spells Ji, where only j1
and j2 are possible to be completed in the data, and every further spell j3, j4, ... is automatically
right-censored with parameters ξˆ3, ξˆ4, ... being unidentifiable.
We decided to drop 826,569 observations that correspond to left-censored spells whenever
we consider exit hazards in our estimations. As Iceland (1997) notes, dropping left-censored
spells may lead to a selection bias when individuals who are in the midst of long-term poverty
6Measurement error may occur, for example, when low income households underreport social welfare benefits
or do not report income earned in the informal sector at all, or when high income households are underrepresented
in the survey (Eckerstorfer et al. 2016) or either underreport or refuse to give any information about their true
income (Paturot et al. 2013).
9
spells are systematically disregarded. Because there is still no general consensus about a proper
way of dealing with left-censoring, we follow Iceland’s advice and compare estimates of (1) the
baseline model without left-censored observations, (2) a model for the full sample where we
keep left-censored observations, and (3) a model where we assume a geometric distribution of
the underlying baseline hazard.7 Results of these exercises are discussed in section V.
According to the U.S. National Bureau of Economic Research, the last financial crisis started
in December 2007 and ended in June 2009.8 In order to analyze how determinants of poverty
dynamics changed due to the crisis, we define ck as a set of dummy variables indicating whether
period k occurs before, during, or after the crisis. Let 1{·} denote an indicator function and let
yk denote the year which period k is measured in, then the elements of ck are defined as
beforek = 1{yk ≤ 2007} (7)
duringk = 1{yk ∈ [2008,2009]} (8)
afterk = 1{yk ≥ 2010} (9)
Thus, the model in (2) can be written as
cloglog[λ ji(k |xkji,ηi)] = δ1d1+δ2d2+δ3d3+ξ2z2+αd ·duringkji
+αa · afterkji+x
′
kjiβ +ηi
(10)
where beforekji is left out as the reference category and our main coefficients of interest (αd,αa)
indicate the magnitude of the structural break induced by the crisis. Coefficients are reported
in exponentiated form which allows interpreting them as hazard ratios with reference to the
left-out pre-crisis period.
III.1. Trends in poverty, 2005–2014
Average poverty rates have been fairly stable over time, especially when compared to other
macroeconomic aggregates. In Figure A.1, we contrast real GDP growth and poverty rates
across different groups of countries. In terms of output, we see a remarkable dip in 2009 which
was particularly pronounced for the Baltic countries. Most economies have been able to recover
afterwards, yet growth rates generally seem to remain below pre-crisis levels. Poverty rates,
on the other hand, are largely unaffected by fluctuations in output and employment. Even in
economic upswings poverty rates are highly persistent, Vandenbroucke & Diris (2014) attribute
this standstill to inefficient social protection systems in Europe: A decline in the effectiveness
7The geometric distribution is the discrete analogue of the exponential distribution. Assuming the baseline
hazard to be geometrically distributed would solve the problem of left-censoring in theory, because the hazard rate
is constant over time and does not depend on time elapsed. However, we are well aware that assuming a constant
baseline hazard is rather unrealistic, as we expect the exit hazard to decrease quadratically over time.
8See http://www.nber.org/cycles.html, accessed Wednesday 1st March, 2017.
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of cash transfers outweighs the pre-transfer decrease in poverty. Disaggregating poverty trends,
however, reveals some heterogeneity across country groups: In social democratic countries
such as Denmark, Finland, and Sweden, as well as in Mediterranean countries such as Italy or
Greece, poverty has in fact increased during the crisis, and remains high ever since. Poverty in
Baltic countries, on the other hand, peaked in 2008—starting with 2009, however, the trend is
pointing downwards.
— Figure A.1 about here —
In the lower graph of Figure A.1, average real GDP growth rate and poverty rates are plotted
on top of each other. Note that the poverty rate fluctuates much less than the graph suggests,
because the vertical axis displays only the interval (0.132,0.140). The graph suggests that
poverty is moving pro-cyclical before and after the crisis, and counter-cyclically during the
crisis. Moreover, the trend at the end of the observation period is pointing slightly upwards
again.
IV. RESULTS
IV.1. Descriptive evidence
In Figure A.2, we provide an event study graph of average regression-adjusted poverty entry and
exit rates over time, relative to the crisis period (note that t = 0 represents the years 2008 and
2009, rates are regression-adjusted for gender and age). Overall, we observe that entry and exit
rates follow a highly similar pattern: Both decreased sharply between 2005 and 2006, and after
recovering marginally in 2007, they have been decreasing steadily ever since. In Figure A.3, we
plot nonparametric Kaplan Meier survival probability estimates for poor individuals (left graph)
and failure probability estimates for non-poor individuals (right graph) given time already in
and out of poverty, respectively. We observe that the probability of escaping poverty decreases
sharply with the time the individual had already been poor before. Pre-crisis, the chances of
escaping poverty for an individual who has been poor one year are roughly 60%, while they
decrease to around 35% for those who have been poor for three years.
— Figure A.2 about here —
Similarly, the right graph indicates that the longer an individual has not been poor before, the
lower her probability is to become poor eventually. The estimated failure probability is highest
after one year out of poverty, and decreases monotonically with every further year. In terms of
the crisis, we see a similar picture as before: Those being poor post-crisis are more likely to be
stuck in poverty, while those who were poor during the pre-crisis period had the best chances
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to escape. Individuals who have only been non-poor for a short time (right graph) have much
higher chances to remain non-poor after the crisis as compared to before. Once the four year
mark has been exceeded, however, individuals seldom become poor again. In the web appendix
(Table B.2), we report additionally unconditional entry and exit rates for different years at risk
of poverty entry or exit, split by the three periods we consider (pre-crisis, crisis, post-crisis).
Similar to the Kaplan Meier graphs, we see that entry probabilities decline monotonically with
every year out of poverty. After one year, the probability of becoming poor is 5.8%, while after
three years it declines to 2.2%. Exit probabilities are higher the shorter an individual has been
poor: After one year it is 27.4%, while it decreases sharply to 1.7% for individuals who have
been poor already three years. After the crisis, escaping poverty becomes less likely even after
one year, and after three years, the probability of doing so is only 1.1%.
— Figure A.3 about here —
Summing up our descriptive results, we observe that (1) entry and exit probabilities de-
cline substantially with the time being already at risk—which is consistent with the vast litera-
ture documenting strong and persistent state dependence in poverty (e.g., Cappellari & Jenkins
2002)—and that both entry and exit hazards are lower after the crisis than before. This is surpris-
ing, since we find that the population of poor after the crisis has socioeconomic characteristics
which seemingly make them less vulnerable to poverty. While this explains why entry hazards
are lower than before, we would expect exit rates in turn to be higher than they actually are. We
will return to this question after discussing our main regression results in the next section V.
IV.2. Poverty transitions due to the crisis
Our main results are reported in Table A.3, where we estimate conditional poverty entry and exit
rates before, during, and after the crisis, respectively, Pre-crisis, the unconditional probability
to enter poverty was comparably high at 4.4% (see Table A.2). We find that during the crisis,
entry hazards are estimated to be 13.4% larger than before the crisis (this amounts to an increase
from 4.4% to roughly 5% in terms of the average entry rate), but decrease by about 12.6% to
3.8% after the crisis. Exit hazards, on the other hand, decrease from an average 30.6% before
the crisis by 6.5% during the crisis, and by a massive 31.4% to an overall 21% after the crisis,
ceteris paribus. All estimates are statistically significant at the 0.1% confidence level. Thus,
even after conditioning on our arsenal of covariates, we still find that exit rates are lower after
the crisis than before. In section V we will discuss whether this is an actual effect of the crisis
or caused by certain unobserved factors which interfere with our crisis indicators.
— Table A.3 about here —
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Another interesting result can be derived from the coefficients on our baseline hazard indi-
cators. Again, δ1, δ2, and δ3 give the cloglog-transformed baseline hazard for (a) people being
non-poor at time t for 1, 2, and 3 years, respectively, in columns (1) and (2); and (b) people
being poor at time t for 1, 2, and 3 years, respectively, in columns (3) and (4). Although these
coefficients do not have a cardinal (but rather an ordinal) interpretation, we observe that the
chance of slipping into poverty is almost twice as high for people who have been non-poor for
only one year than for people who have been non-poor for two years. This suggests that there
may be some continuous switching of individuals around the poverty threshold. Exit hazards
are also highest for people who have been poor for only one year, and decrease strictly mono-
tonically afterwards. Additionally, the coefficient on ξ2 suggests that people who have their
second poverty spell in the data have a 75.6% lower chance of exiting poverty.
— Figure A.4 about here —
In Figure A.4, we plot these predicted poverty entry and exit hazards from Table A.3 as a
function of years out of poverty and already in poverty, respectively. Both entry and exit hazards
decrease the longer a person was not in poverty (regarding entry rates), or in poverty (regarding
exit rates). Again we observe that after the crisis, both entry and exit hazards are generally
lower than before the crisis. During the crisis, conditional entry and exit hazards are similar to
those observed before the crisis.
IV.3. Heterogeneous effects by country groups
In Table A.4, we report heterogeneous effects by country groups. It seems that results in Ta-
ble A.3 are mostly driven by Continental European economies (e.g., Austria or France, see
Table A.1 for an overview on the classification of countries). Liberal market economies such
as the United Kingdom seem to fare reasonably well, with entry hazards being relatively low
(especially post-crisis), and exit hazards being high at 127.6% compared to pre-crisis levels. In
Eastern European countries, entry hazards increased by 41.8% during the crisis, and are still
18.9% higher than before after the crisis. Exit hazards, on the other hand, are 44% lower, so
poverty seems to be rather persistent in these countries. In countries such as Greece or Italy
which are generally believed to be struck hardest by the crisis, poverty entry has increased,
ceteris paribus, by only by 9.8% during the crisis, yet exit rates are now 22.9% lower than be-
fore. In Northern countries (in particular Denmark, Finland, and Sweden), entry hazards also
increased during the crisis, but have moved back to pre-crisis levels afterwards. On top of that,
exit rates are 24.2% higher than before. Baltic countries, which were hit strong by the crisis
as well but were able to recover better than other countries face both much lower entry rates
(in fact, post-crisis they are estimated to be 52.6% lower than before), yet also exit rates have
decreased by 48.5% compared to pre-crisis levels.
13
— Table A.4 about here —
IV.4. Determinants of poverty entry hazards
In Table A.5, we compare determinants of entry rates before, during, and after the financial
crisis. In terms of coefficient magnitude, the most important determinants of poverty entries
and exits are having a permanent job, suffering from a physical limitation, age, education,
marital status and the number of children in the household, and the country of origin. Having
a permanent job decreases the entry hazard, ceteris paribus, by over 50% before and after the
crisis, and by an even higher 69.1% during the crisis. Having a physical limitation increases
the entry hazard by 14.1%–25.5%. In terms of age, we find that the most vulnerable group
is between 35 and 50 years old, with estimated hazard rates being lower for all other groups.
Interestingly, being female does influence entry hazards only marginally post-crisis, and has no
effect at all before and during the crisis.
— Table A.5 about here —
Considering marital status, it turns out that being divorced is associated with a 52.5% higher
chance of sliding into poverty compared to married people, ceteris paribus, and this effect even
increases slightly during the crisis by 4.7 percentage points. Being separated increases the
hazard of becoming poor by 31.8% before the crisis, and by a massive 83.1% after the crisis.
High skilled blue collar workers also have a 83% higher risk of becoming poor than high skilled
white collar workers. During the crisis, the effect was even 2.5 times higher. Tertiary education
reduces the chances of becoming poor by around 25.7% versus upper secondary education,
and is having a university degree is slightly more protective after the crisis than before. In
turn, having only pre-primary education increases chances to enter poverty by 35% before the
crisis compared to individuals who have upper secondary education, and by an even higher
86.9% after the crisis. Overall, marital status, age, and education seem to be highly important
determinants for the decrease in exit rates after the crisis.
On the household level, the number of children and population density are by far the most
important determinants of poverty entries. Before the crisis, every additional child increases
the chance to slip into poverty by 29.8%. However, this effect decreases, ceteris paribus, by
16 percentage points to 14% for every additional child after the crisis. Living in a densely
populated area reduces chances of entering by 18.1% before the crisis, and this effect increases
even more by 18 percentage points during the crisis. After the crisis, it is almost the same as
before, yet roughly two percentage points higher. On the country-level, we find that unem-
ployment rate correlates negatively with the hazard of entering poverty before the crisis, but
positively during the crisis and afterwards. Here further research is necessary to analyze this
switch in signs. Gross domestic product also seems to be an important control variable, yet its
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coefficient is rather uninformative as it gives the change in the hazard rate for a doubling in
GDP. We can conclude that the effect of GDP on the entry hazard is small but significant. In
terms of country-of-origin, we find significantly higher poverty entry hazards in Mediterranean
economies compared to other countries.
In Table B.4 in the web appendix, we additionally provide results from a conditional logit
fixed effects model as specified in section II.2, with poverty status in binary form as the out-
come variable. In generally, the conclusions drawn from the panel logit model resemble those
we obtain from our survival analysis reasonably well. We find that sliding into poverty was
significantly more difficult after the crisis compared to before. Main determinants of poverty
transitions are having a permanent job (which reduces the odds of becoming poor by over 50%),
being retired, age, household size, and the number of children. Due to their greater statistical
flexibility, however, we base our main conclusions on the survival models.
IV.5. Determinants of poverty exit hazards
Once stuck in poverty, it is important which socioeconomic and demographic factors facilitate
exit thereof. In Table A.6, we report determinants of exit hazards for people in poverty before,
during, and after the financial crisis. In terms of the baseline hazard, we generally observe a
strong monotonic decrease in exit hazards the longer a person has been poor. During the crisis,
however, individuals who had already been poor between one and two years had a baseline
hazard insignificantly different from zero, yet it increases dramatically for individuals who had
been poor three years. After the crisis, individuals who were already poor once had a 32.1%
chance of becoming poor again.
— Table A.6 about here —
Before the crisis, retirees, people who owned their dwelling instead of renting it, those who
have never been married, who were high skilled white collar workers, and those who lived in
Continental European countries had the best chances to exit poverty. For example, being re-
tired was associated with a 47.7% increase in the chance of leaving poverty, and being between
50 and 64 years of age caused exit hazards to be 62.5% higher, ceteris paribus. Interestingly,
having a permanent job did not influence exit hazards, and higher education was also no pro-
tective factor in this regard, yet lower education indeed does decrease exit probabilities. During
the crisis, having a job became important. Even more so, however, was being retired—retirees
enjoyed a 2.3 times higher chance of escaping poverty than others. The effects of age, marital
status, and occupation did not change due to the crisis as compared to before. Finally, people
living in a Continental European country had a 3.5 times higher chance of escaping during the
crisis than people from social democratic economies, this effect flattened out post-crisis.
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IV.6. Mechanisms
In order to investigate potential mechanisms driving our results, we estimate conditional panel
fixed effects logit models in Table A.7 on several outcome variables we believe are interesting
intermediate outcomes. In particular, we look at (1) a dummy variable indicating whether the
individual reports difficulties to make ends meet, (2) a dummy equal to unity if the individual
reports that housing cost are a heavy financial burden, and (3) a dummy indicating whether
repayment of debts or loans are a heavy financial burden to the individual. Note that coefficients
are given as odds ratios, thus their magnitude may not be compared directly to the hazard ratios
estimated in section IV.
— Table A.7 about here —
Estimates in Table A.7 suggest that both the odds of reporting difficulties to make ends meet
and the odds of declaring that repayment of debts is a heavy financial burden in fact decreased in
the aftermath of the crisis, which is an interesting result by itself but does not tell us much about
potential mechanisms governing poverty persistence. The odds of reporting a burden caused by
housing cost, however, are roughly 50% higher after the crisis compared to before. Generally,
housing cost make up a substantial portion of individual living expenses in Europe: Around
11.9% of the total population spend more than 40% of their equivalized disposable income on
housing (Eurostat 2017c), and in our sample, housing on average makes up for roughly 20%
of disposable income. Thus, a housing cost overburden is likely an important determinant of
poverty persistence.
V. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSES
As mentioned in section IV.2, we are puzzled by the fact that exit rates are lower after the
crisis compared to before, given that the population of poor has seemingly better socioeconomic
characteristics from a subjective standpoint. There are two possible explanations: Either it is
in fact the crisis which caused a structural change to the system making it substantially more
difficult to escape poverty, despite having favorable socioeconomic endowments, or there is
a compositional change in the population of poor which happened over the years and is not
captured by our covariates. This is rather unlikely, however, since we control for most variables
one would remotely associate with poverty. As a robustness check, we plot the average distance
in Euros between an individual’s income and the poverty threshold against time in Figure A.5.
In case there were unobserved third variables determining poverty status which changed due
to the crisis, we would expect the average distance for those at risk of exit to increase at least
slightly. This is not what we see: In fact, the distance for those at risk remains remarkably
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constant over time. Thus, we conclude that it is most likely a structural change induced by the
crisis making it more difficult to escape poverty.
— Figure A.5 about here —
Additionally, we want to rule out the possibility that our results are driven by individuals
switching around the poverty threshold (note that this would lead to an overestimation of exit
rates, making the hazard rate even lower as they would be in the absence of excessive switching).
As a robustness check, we therefore draw a 10% band around the poverty threshold. Entries are
only considered if the drop in income exceeds this band, and likewise, exits are only considered
if income increases from under 90% to at least above 110% of the poverty threshold. Results
are reported in Table B.5 in the web appendix. Our estimated hazard rates are practically un-
changed, in most cases they are even higher than reported in Table A.3. Excessive switching
around the cutoff therefore does not influence our results.
Finally, as mentioned in section III we follow the literature and simply drop left-censored
observations whenever we consider poverty exit hazards. Doing so may induce selection bias,
however, if individuals who are in the midst of lengthy poverty spells (Iceland 1997). We there-
fore follow Iceland and compare our baseline estimates from table A.3 with two other model
specifications; one where we keep all left-censored observations and one where we assume a
geometric distribution of the baseline hazard.9 Iceland notes that, while this approach “does not
‘solve’ the problem of censoring, it may still shed light on the issue of interest.” Results of this
exercise are reported in Table B.6 in the web appendix. If we include left-censored observations
and rerun our analysis, exit rates are even slightly higher than before (column 2). If we specify
a constant baseline hazard, results change neither, and again the estimated exit rate is slightly
higher than in the baseline model.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyzed the impact of the global financial crisis between starting at the end
of 2007 on poverty patterns in Europe. For our empirical analysis we used longitudinal data
from the European Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) comprising over 1.9
million individuals from 29 countries followed over nine years. Estimating semiparametric
mixed proportional hazards discrete time duration models, we find that poverty entry hazards
increased temporarily during the crisis, before decreasing to 84.3% of pre-crisis levels. Not only
entry hazards have decreased due to the crisis, also exit hazards declined substantially. Being
only 6.5% lower during the crisis, post-crisis they have shrunk by an estimated 31.4% compared
9In case the underlying survival process is constant of time, assuming a geometrically distributed baseline
hazard solves the problem of left-censoring (see also section III).
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to before, ceteris paribus. Since we are likely able to identify our crisis-effects without bias
caused by unobserved heterogeneities among the population or switching around the poverty
threshold, we presume that the crisis caused a profound systemic disruption which has made
poverty much more persistent than before.
Additionally, we examined determinants of poverty transitions. Our estimates suggest hav-
ing a permanent job, having physical limitations, being widowed, having tertiary education,
and the number of children in the household have the biggest impact on both entry hazards
(negatively) and exit hazards (positively). Finally, we also used panel logit fixed-effects regres-
sions to determine potential mechanisms explaining these structural changes we detect. Here
it turns out that the financial burden due to housing cost increased massively during the crisis,
potentially being responsible for the increase in poverty persistence.
Our results bear important implications for policy makers: We have seen that the crisis
likely caused a disruption to the system making poverty more persistent, i.e., more difficult
to escape. By intervening in one of the areas related to entry and exit determinants discussed
above, this development can potentially be reversed. An important limitation of our study is the
short observation period provided by the EU-SILC. Longer rotational panels would definitely
help to further our understanding of poverty transitions (especially when it comes to state de-
pendency of poverty) and determinants thereof. Furthermore, in order to provide more efficient
policy recommendations, a more careful investigation on potential mechanisms governing the
relationship between macroeconomic aggregates and poverty is necessary. This shall be subject
of future research.
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A. TABLES AND FIGURES
TABLE A.1 — Classification of countries according to Aristei & Perugini (2015)
Category Abbr.a Countries %b
Liberal market economies LibME Iceland, Ireland, United Kingdom 7.9
Continental European economies ContEE Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, Netherlands 16.8
Social democratic countries SocDC Denmark, Finland, Sweden 9.8
Mediterranean countries MedC Cyprus, Greece, Spain, Italy, Malta, Portugal 27.5
Eastern European Countries EastEC Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland,
Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia
29.9
Baltic countries BaltC Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia 8.2
Notes: a Abbreviation, b observations belonging to this country group in % of total sample.
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TABLE A.2 — Summary statistics for people at risk of entering or exiting poverty, and for people experiencing an entry or exit event.
Individuals at risk of entering/exiting poverty Individuals who experience entry or exit event
At risk of entry At risk of exit Individuals entering poverty Individuals exiting poverty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Pre Crisis Post Pre Crisis Post Pre Crisis Post Pre Crisis Post
Average survival time T 1.703 2.187 2.256 1.189 1.329 1.364 1.390 1.592 1.556 1.096 1.162 1.165
Poverty exit probability 0.306 0.269 0.197
Poverty entry probability 0.044 0.039 0.030
Individual-level characteristics
Female 0.415 0.424 0.430 0.406 0.417 0.405 0.423 0.418 0.423 0.426 0.446 0.432
Has permanent job 0.273 0.274 0.378 0.101 0.104 0.210 0.125 0.137 0.241 0.139 0.148 0.245
Retired 0.011 0.097 0.211 0.011 0.094 0.153 0.011 0.074 0.166 0.012 0.102 0.168
Has chronic disease 0.200 0.214 0.230 0.229 0.250 0.238 0.242 0.244 0.246 0.225 0.263 0.247
Has physical limitation 0.159 0.172 0.182 0.204 0.220 0.201 0.211 0.212 0.208 0.192 0.226 0.201
Owns dwelling 0.798 0.773 0.048 0.686 0.707 0.093 0.711 0.701 0.066 0.722 0.723 0.089
Age categories
Age < 25 0.116 0.113 0.105 0.122 0.117 0.126 0.129 0.134 0.131 0.142 0.125 0.135
25 ≤ age < 35 0.124 0.118 0.109 0.092 0.090 0.097 0.106 0.112 0.110 0.105 0.101 0.107
35 ≤ age < 50 0.416 0.397 0.383 0.459 0.442 0.455 0.423 0.425 0.416 0.435 0.399 0.412
50 ≤ age < 65 0.197 0.211 0.221 0.157 0.166 0.184 0.163 0.176 0.191 0.172 0.188 0.195
Age ≥ 65 0.147 0.162 0.182 0.170 0.185 0.139 0.179 0.153 0.152 0.146 0.187 0.151
Marital status
Never married 0.231 0.232 0.231 0.217 0.210 0.238 0.228 0.237 0.251 0.245 0.226 0.252
Married 0.458 0.468 0.466 0.354 0.362 0.352 0.396 0.413 0.394 0.392 0.401 0.389
Separated 0.013 0.007 0.008 0.014 0.013 0.014 0.016 0.012 0.014 0.014 0.012 0.012
Widowed 0.058 0.064 0.068 0.090 0.103 0.081 0.083 0.072 0.072 0.078 0.103 0.085
Divorced 0.038 0.042 0.047 0.048 0.052 0.056 0.050 0.051 0.058 0.045 0.056 0.057
Missing 0.200 0.187 0.180 0.276 0.259 0.260 0.226 0.216 0.212 0.226 0.202 0.204
Highest educational level achieved
Pre-primary 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.015 0.011 0.010 0.010 0.012 0.009
Primary 0.107 0.092 0.083 0.161 0.150 0.119 0.167 0.146 0.124 0.150 0.143 0.113
Lower secondary 0.155 0.163 0.160 0.187 0.207 0.205 0.200 0.216 0.215 0.189 0.214 0.206
Upper secondary 0.325 0.342 0.338 0.253 0.267 0.289 0.274 0.285 0.306 0.298 0.297 0.328
Post-secondary, non-tertiary 0.031 0.027 0.026 0.024 0.020 0.019 0.024 0.022 0.020 0.026 0.026 0.025
Tertiary 0.374 0.369 0.386 0.362 0.344 0.355 0.320 0.320 0.325 0.327 0.309 0.319
Household-level characteristics
Equivalized household size 2.049 2.031 1.996 1.995 1.973 2.015 2.089 2.109 2.100 2.092 2.018 2.052
Number of children in the household 0.664 0.614 0.655 0.764 0.734 0.975 0.833 0.812 0.844 0.812 0.725 0.867
Densely populated area 0.361 0.349 0.349 0.335 0.315 0.318 0.328 0.316 0.320 0.322 0.333 0.331
log(imputed rent) 6.761 6.891 6.913 6.515 6.246 6.209 6.370 6.450 6.304 6.517 6.480 6.406
Observations 1,397,623 954,392 2,428,504 46,534 42,909 107,447 61,964 37,119 73,784 14,228 11,533 21,124
Notes: This table gives sample means of all variables on the individual and household level included in the regressions. A full table including also second moments can be found in the
online appendix. Variables in columns (1) to (6) are measured for individuals who are at risk of entering [columns (1) – (3)] or exiting [columns (4) – (6)] poverty, while variables in
columns (7) to (12) are measured for individuals who actually experience an entry or exit event.
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TABLE A.3 — Effect of financial crisis on poverty entry and exit hazards (discrete time mixed propor-
tional hazards models).
Poverty entry hazard Poverty exit hazard
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis indicators (reference category: before crisis)
During crisis 1.091*** (0.01) 1.134*** (0.01) 0.944*** (0.01) 0.935*** (0.01)
After crisis 0.874*** (0.01) 0.843*** (0.01) 0.667*** (0.01) 0.686*** (0.01)
Duration dependence
exp(δ1) 0.027*** (0.00) 50.085*** (5.67) 0.406*** (0.00) 0.165*** (0.04)
exp(δ2) 0.017*** (0.00) 28.445*** (3.25) 0.225*** (0.00) 0.091*** (0.02)
exp(δ3) 0.013*** (0.00) 21.170*** (2.43) 0.023*** (0.00) 0.009*** (0.00)
exp(ξ2) 0.341*** (0.03) 0.862** (0.06) 0.288*** (0.01) 0.244*** (0.01)
Other covariatesa No Yes No Yes
σˆη 1.3710 0.5136 0.0005 0.0247
ρˆ 0.5333 0.1382 0.0000 0.0004
Log-likelihood –700,513.7 –667,924.41 242,340.05 –28,691.11
Number of observations 4,168,000 4,168,000 196,021 196,021
Number of individuals 1,817,479 1,817,479 143,444 143,444
Notes: This table reports the difference in poverty entry and exit hazard rates depending on whether the person was at
risk during or after the big financial crisis, as compared to before. Coefficients are exponentiated and can be interpreted
as hazard ratios, individual-level clustered standard errors are given in parentheses next to coefficients. Stars indicate
significance levels: * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
aWe control for gender, occupation, health proxies, dwelling type, age, marital status, education, household size, number
of children, type of neighborhood, GDP, and unemployment rate (a detailed overview on our control variables is provided
in section III). Additionally, we include missing indicator dummies for education and marital status.
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TABLE A.4 — Heterogeneous effects: Effect of financial crisis on poverty entry and exit hazards, sample
stratified by country groups (discrete time mixed proportional hazards models).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BaltC ContEE EastEC LibME MedC SocDC
Poverty entry hazard
Crisis indicators (reference category: before crisis)
During crisis 0.787*** 1.049** 1.418*** 0.493*** 1.098*** 1.121***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
After crisis 0.474*** 0.635*** 1.189*** 0.364*** 0.814*** 1.018
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.05)
Duration dependencea Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariatesb Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
σˆη 0.0242 0.6121 0.9611 0.7144 0.0001 0.8816
ρˆ 0.0004 0.1855 0.3596 0.2368 0.0000 0.3209
Log-likelihood 50,149.1 –89,139.9 –187,141.6 –57,421.6 1,553,834.3 –47617.16
Number of observations 341,326 678,770 1,246,317 349,332 1,105,757 446,498
Number of individuals 147,488 288,566 537,054 176,183 479,190 188,998
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
BaltC ContEE EastEC LibME MedC SocDC
Poverty exit hazard
Crisis indicators (reference category: before crisis)
During crisis 1.063 0.814*** 0.826*** 1.208*** 0.977 0.757***
(0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.07)
After crisis 0.515*** 0.581*** 0.560*** 1.276*** 0.771*** 1.242*
(0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.08) (0.02) (0.15)
Duration dependencea Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Covariatesb Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
σˆη 1.6212 0.8807 1.0103 0.0001 0.6811 1.5120
ρˆ 0.6151 0.3204 0.3829 0.0000 0.2200 0.5816
Log-likelihood –10,040.4 –14,952.4 –27,317.0 35,017.2 –32,564.4 –5,577.53
Number of observations 18,754 25,725 51,514 14,675 61,393 11,519
Number of individuals 14,825 18,146 40,706 12,588 47,543 9,636
Notes: In this table we stratify the sample into different country groups and report only the crisis coefficients. Essentially, we reestimate
the specifications from Table A.3, columns (2) and (4) for different sets of countries in the data. A full overview on how countries
are classified into groups is provided in Table A.1; “BaltC” refers to Baltic countries, “ContEE” to Continental European economies,
“EastEC” to Eastern European countries, “LibME” to liberal market economies,“MedC” to Mediterranean countries, and “SocDC”
refers to social democratic countries. Coefficients are exponentiated and can be interpreted as hazard ratios, individual-level clustered
standard errors are given in parentheses next to coefficients. Stars indicate significance levels: * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
aWe do not report the coefficients ̂exp(δ1), ̂exp(δ2), ̂exp(δ3), and ̂exp(ξ2), which indicate how entry and exit hazards change depending
on the time already outside or inside poverty, respectively.
bWe control for gender, occupation, health proxies, dwelling type, age, marital status, education, household size, number of children,
type of neighborhood, GDP, and unemployment rate (a detailed overview on our control variables is provided in section III). Additionally,
we include missing indicator dummies for education and marital status.
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TABLE A.5 — Determinants of poverty entry hazards before, during, and after the financial crisis (dis-
crete time mixed proportional hazards models).
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Diff.† Coef. Std. err. Diff.†
Duration dependence
exp(δ1) 39.629*** (9.40) 0.196*** (0.08) –39.43*** 39.460*** (6.61) –0.17
exp(δ2) 22.871*** (5.44) 0.232*** (0.09) –22.64*** 20.217*** (3.39) –2.65
exp(δ3) 13.133*** (3.14) 0.227*** (0.09) –12.91*** 16.740*** (2.82) 3.61
exp(ξ2) 0.993 (0.03) 0.883*** (0.04) –0.11** 1.198*** (0.03) 0.20***
Individual-level characteristics
Female 1.015 (0.01) 1.021 (0.02) 0.01 1.043*** (0.01) 0.03**
Has permanent job 0.466*** (0.01) 0.309*** (0.01) –0.16*** 0.494*** (0.01) 0.03***
Retired 0.907** (0.04) 3.293*** (0.11) 2.39*** 0.950*** (0.01) 0.04
Has chronic disease 1.046*** (0.02) 1.078*** (0.03) 0.03 1.093*** (0.01) 0.05**
Has physical limitation 1.141*** (0.02) 1.255*** (0.03) 0.11*** 1.167*** (0.02) 0.03
Owns dwelling 1.046** (0.02) 0.121*** (0.01) –0.92*** 0.019*** (0.00) –1.03***
Age category (reference category: 35 ≤ age < 50)
Age < 25 0.776*** (0.01) 0.733*** (0.03) –0.04 0.842*** (0.01) 0.07***
25 ≤ age < 35 0.806*** (0.01) 0.791*** (0.02) –0.02 0.920*** (0.01) 0.11***
50 ≤ age < 65 0.843*** (0.01) 0.697*** (0.02) –0.15*** 0.878*** (0.01) 0.03**
Age ≥ 65 0.770*** (0.01) 0.440*** (0.02) –0.33*** 0.687*** (0.01) –0.08***
Marital status (reference category: married)‡
Never married 1.176*** (0.02) 1.219*** (0.04) 0.04 1.133*** (0.02) –0.04*
Separated 1.318*** (0.04) 1.675*** (0.13) 0.36** 1.831*** (0.06) 0.51***
Widowed 1.142*** (0.02) 1.170*** (0.04) 0.03 1.135*** (0.02) –0.01
Divorced 1.525*** (0.03) 1.991*** (0.08) 0.47*** 1.538*** (0.03) 0.01
Occupation (reference category: high skilled white collar worker)‡
Low skilled white collar 1.363*** (0.03) 1.451*** (0.06) 0.09 1.422*** (0.03) 0.06
High skilled blue collar 2.122*** (0.05) 2.580*** (0.11) 0.46*** 1.830*** (0.03) –0.29***
Low skilled blue collar 1.834*** (0.04) 2.186*** (0.09) 0.35*** 1.793*** (0.03) –0.04
Armed forces 1.308*** (0.10) 2.961*** (0.27) 1.65*** 1.389*** (0.05) 0.08
Highest educational level achieved (reference category: upper secondary)‡
Pre-primary 1.350*** (0.05) 1.685*** (0.10) 0.33*** 1.869*** (0.10) 0.52***
Primary 1.217*** (0.02) 1.542*** (0.05) 0.33*** 1.272*** (0.02) 0.05**
Lower secondary 1.222*** (0.02) 1.646*** (0.04) 0.42*** 1.282*** (0.01) 0.06***
Post secondary non-tertiary 0.883*** (0.02) 1.019 (0.06) 0.14** 0.894*** (0.02) 0.01
Tertiary 0.802*** (0.01) 0.768*** (0.02) –0.03 0.743*** (0.01) –0.06***
Household-level characteristics
Equivalized household size 0.915*** (0.01) 0.977 (0.01) 0.06*** 1.119*** (0.01) 0.20***
Number of children in household 1.298*** (0.01) 1.432*** (0.02) 0.13*** 1.140*** (0.00) –0.16***
Densely populated area 0.819*** (0.01) 0.634*** (0.01) –0.18*** 0.840*** (0.01) 0.02**
log(imputed rent) 0.956*** (0.00) 1.036*** (0.00) 0.08*** 0.950*** (0.00) –0.01***
log(imputed rent) × owns dwelling 0.948*** (0.00) 1.187*** (0.01) 0.24*** 1.404*** (0.02) 0.46***
Country-level characteristics
log(GDP) 0.582*** (0.01) 0.562*** (0.02) –0.02 0.483*** (0.01) –0.10***
Unemployment rate 0.924*** (0.00) 1.273*** (0.00) 0.35*** 1.038*** (0.00) 0.11***
Country group (reference category: social democratic economy)
Baltic country 1.248*** (0.05) 1.616*** (0.10) 0.37*** 0.829*** (0.02) –0.42***
Continental European economy 1.276*** (0.02) 2.150*** (0.09) 0.87*** 1.344*** (0.02) 0.07*
Eastern European economy 0.961 (0.03) 1.332*** (0.08) 0.37*** 0.642*** (0.02) –0.32***
Liberal market economy 1.254*** (0.03) 2.828*** (0.13) 1.57*** 1.718*** (0.03) 0.46***
Mediterranean economy 1.960*** (0.04) 2.308*** (0.10) 0.35*** 1.230*** (0.02) –0.73***
σˆη 0.0000 2.4663 0.0001
ρˆ 0.0000 0.7871 0.0000
Log-likelihood 1,349,086.2 −132,633.3 3,897,881.1
Number of observations 799,894 768,114 2,599,992
Number of individuals 409,231 333,682 1,102,558
Notes: This table reports the effect of several demographic and socioeconomic factors on the hazard of entering poverty for individuals whose income
is above the poverty threshold. Columns (1), (2), and (3) are independent discrete time mixed proportional hazards models estimated on a sample of
individuals being at risk of poverty before the crisis (1), during the crisis (2), and after the crisis (3). Coefficients are exponentiated and can be interpreted
as hazard ratios, standard errors are given in parentheses next to coefficients. Stars indicate significance levels: * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
†Difference with respect to the coefficient in column (1). The stars indicate the p-value for the z-test on the difference between coefficients.
‡Observations with missing values on this variable are flagged using a missing indicator dummy and included in the regression.
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TABLE A.6 — Determinants of poverty exit hazards before, during, and after the financial crisis (discrete
time mixed proportional hazards models).
(1) (2) (3)
Pre-crisis Crisis Post-crisis
Coef. Std. err. Coef. Std. err. Diff.† Coef. Std. err. Diff.†
Duration dependence
exp(δ1) 38.822*** (49.08) 0.674 (0.55) –38.15 0.049*** (0.02) –38.77
exp(δ2) 51.934*** (66.26) 0.762 (0.63) –51.17 0.028*** (0.01) –51.91
exp(δ3) 11.851* (15.28) 0.085*** (0.07) –11.77 0.002*** (0.00) –11.85
exp(ξ2) 0.007*** (0.00) 0.070*** (0.01) 0.06*** 0.321*** (0.02) 0.31***
Individual-level characteristics
Female 1.089* (0.05) 1.123*** (0.05) 0.03 1.016 (0.02) –0.07
Has permanent job 1.106 (0.07) 1.337*** (0.09) 0.23* 0.973 (0.02) –0.13*
Retired 1.477*** (0.22) 2.263*** (0.16) 0.79*** 1.110*** (0.03) –0.37
Has chronic disease 1.135** (0.06) 1.135** (0.06) 0.00 1.001 (0.02) –0.13*
Has physical limitation 0.928 (0.05) 0.888** (0.05) –0.04 0.938** (0.02) 0.01
Owns dwelling 1.513*** (0.13) 0.552*** (0.06) –0.96*** 0.047*** (0.01) –1.47***
Age category (reference category: 35 ≤ age < 50)
Age < 25 1.217** (0.10) 1.277*** (0.10) 0.06 1.095*** (0.03) –0.12
25 ≤ age < 35 1.031 (0.07) 1.112 (0.08) 0.08 1.059** (0.03) 0.03
50 ≤ age < 65 1.625*** (0.11) 1.528*** (0.10) –0.10 1.039 (0.02) –0.59***
Age ≥ 65 1.421*** (0.11) 1.438*** (0.11) 0.02 1.101*** (0.04) –0.32***
Marital status (reference category: married)‡
Never married 1.265*** (0.08) 1.114* (0.07) –0.15 0.966 (0.02) –0.30***
Separated 1.280* (0.19) 0.927 (0.14) –0.35 0.812*** (0.05) –0.47**
Widowed 1.095 (0.08) 0.995 (0.07) –0.10 1.075** (0.03) –0.02
Divorced 0.950 (0.08) 0.942 (0.08) –0.01 0.948* (0.03) 0.00
Occupation (reference category: high skilled white collar worker)‡
Low skilled white collar 0.833* (0.09) 0.829* (0.08) 0.00 0.856*** (0.03) 0.02
High skilled blue collar 0.715*** (0.07) 0.719*** (0.07) 0.00 0.816*** (0.03) 0.10
Low skilled blue collar 0.786** (0.08) 0.714*** (0.07) –0.07 0.887*** (0.03) 0.10
Highest educational level achieved (reference category: upper secondary)‡
Pre-primary 0.577*** (0.10) 1.030 (0.17) 0.45** 0.596*** (0.05) 0.02
Primary 0.689*** (0.04) 0.747*** (0.05) 0.06 0.882*** (0.02) 0.19***
Lower secondary 0.786*** (0.04) 0.951 (0.05) 0.17** 0.880*** (0.02) 0.09**
Post secondary non-tertiary 0.910 (0.10) 1.246* (0.14) 0.34* 1.078 (0.05) 0.17
Tertiary 0.961 (0.07) 1.042 (0.07) 0.08 0.982 (0.02) 0.02
Household-level characteristics
Equivalized household size 1.562*** (0.06) 1.348*** (0.05) –0.21*** 1.199*** (0.01) –0.36***
Number of children in household 1.111*** (0.02) 1.074*** (0.02) –0.04 0.932*** (0.01) –0.18***
Densely populated area 0.976 (0.04) 1.060 (0.04) 0.08 1.022 (0.02) 0.05
log(imputed rent) 0.964*** (0.01) 1.035*** (0.01) 0.07*** 1.022*** (0.00) 0.06***
log(imputed rent) × owns dwelling 1.007 (0.01) 1.083*** (0.02) 0.08*** 1.381*** (0.04) 0.37***
Country-level characteristics
log(GDP) 0.636*** (0.07) 0.776*** (0.06) 0.14 1.145*** (0.03) 0.51***
Unemployment rate 0.892*** (0.01) 1.099*** (0.01) 0.21*** 1.010*** (0.00) 0.12***
Country group (reference category: social democratic economy)
Baltic country 0.379*** (0.07) 0.932 (0.12) 0.55*** 1.255*** (0.06) 0.88***
Continental European economy 2.988*** (0.27) 3.467*** (0.41) 0.48 1.475*** (0.05) –1.51***
Eastern European economy 0.823 (0.13) 1.024 (0.14) 0.20 1.133** (0.06) 0.31**
Liberal market economy 0.365*** (0.04) 1.306*** (0.13) 0.94*** 1.306*** (0.05) 0.94***
Mediterranean economy 1.146 (0.10) 0.988 (0.09) –0.16 0.943 (0.04) –0.20*
σˆη 2.2279 1.9568 0.0001
ρˆ 0.7511 0.6995 0.0000
Log-likelihood −24,249.33 −22,206.51 244,932.89
Number of observations 40,145 40,984 114,892
Number of individuals 33,311 30,319 82,316
Notes: This table reports the effect of several demographic and socioeconomic factors on the hazard of exiting poverty for individuals who are poor. Columns
(1), (2), and (3) are independent discrete time mixed proportional hazards models estimated on a sample of individuals being poor before the crisis (1), during
the crisis (2), and after the crisis (3). Coefficients are exponentiated and can be interpreted as hazard ratios, standard errors are given in parentheses next to
coefficients. Stars indicate significance levels: * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
†Difference with respect to the coefficient in column (1). The stars indicate the p-value for the z-test on the difference between coefficients.
‡Observations with missing values on this variable are flagged using a missing indicator dummy and included in the regression.
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TABLE A.7 — Effect of financial crisis on different other outcomes possibly related to poverty (fixed-
effects panel logit model).
(1) (2) (3)
Difficulties to Housing cost are Repayment of debts
make ends meet heavy fin. burden is heavy fin. burden
Crisis indicators (reference category: before crisis)
During crisis 0.738*** (0.03) 1.139*** (0.05) 0.836** (0.06)
After crisis 0.858*** (0.04) 1.501*** (0.08) 0.505*** (0.04)
Individual-level characteristics
Has permanent job 0.835*** (0.01) 0.854*** (0.01) 0.935*** (0.01)
Retired 0.950*** (0.01) 0.904*** (0.01) 0.882*** (0.02)
Has chronic disease 1.061*** (0.01) 1.163*** (0.01) 1.219*** (0.01)
Has physical limitation 1.217*** (0.01) 1.157*** (0.01) 1.152*** (0.01)
Owns dwelling 0.903*** (0.02) 0.754*** (0.01) 1.079*** (0.03)
Age category (reference category: 35 ≤ age < 50)
Age < 25 1.125*** (0.02) 1.102*** (0.02) 0.995 (0.02)
25 ≤ age < 35 1.004 (0.02) 1.047*** (0.01) 1.022 (0.02)
50 ≤ age < 65 0.876*** (0.01) 0.920*** (0.01) 0.954** (0.02)
Age ≥ 65 0.832*** (0.02) 0.853*** (0.02) 0.827*** (0.03)
Marital status (reference category: married)‡
Never married 1.142*** (0.02) 1.145*** (0.02) 1.025 (0.02)
Separated 1.460*** (0.05) 1.272*** (0.04) 1.127*** (0.04)
Widowed 1.193*** (0.03) 1.250*** (0.03) 1.048 (0.04)
Divorced 1.231*** (0.03) 1.236*** (0.03) 1.084*** (0.03)
Occupation (reference category: high skilled white collar worker)‡
Low skilled white collar 1.117*** (0.01) 1.038*** (0.01) 1.078*** (0.02)
High skilled blue collar 1.136*** (0.02) 1.005 (0.01) 1.080*** (0.02)
Low skilled blue collar 1.125*** (0.02) 1.011 (0.01) 1.116*** (0.02)
Household-level characteristics
Equivalized household size 1.025** (0.01) 1.009 (0.01) 1.319*** (0.01)
Number of children in household 1.004 (0.00) 1.023*** (0.00) 1.024*** (0.00)
Densely populated area 1.048*** (0.02) 1.037** (0.01) 0.941*** (0.02)
log(imputed rent) 0.984*** (0.00) 0.979*** (0.00) 1.008*** (0.00)
log(imputed rent) × owns dwelling 1.015*** (0.00) 1.029*** (0.00) 0.978*** (0.00)
Country-level characteristics
log(GDP) 0.804*** (0.03) 0.677*** (0.03) 0.383*** (0.02)
Unemployment rate 1.055*** (0.00) 1.031*** (0.00) 1.017*** (0.00)
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes
Log-likelihood –550,525.18 –694,507.72 –331,465.57
Number of observations 1,498,458 1,879,931 905,891
Number of individuals 436,758 554,571 268,814
Notes: In this table we estimate the impact of the financial crisis on outcomes other than poverty. We use conditional logit models
incorporating individual-level fixed effects (Wooldridge 2010). Following Correia (2015), we drop observations for whom the value
of the respective outcome variable never changes during the observation period prior to performing the estimation in order to improve
computational efficiency. Coefficients are exponentiated and can be interpreted as odds ratios, individual-level clustered standard errors
are given in parentheses next to coefficients. Stars indicate significance levels: * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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FIGURE A.1 — Real GDP growth and poverty rates for different groups of countries in the data.
−
15
−
10
−
5
0
5
10
R
ea
l G
DP
 g
ro
wt
h 
ra
te
s
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Year
Real GDP growth rate
0.
05
0.
10
0.
15
0.
20
Po
ve
rty
 ra
te
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Year
Poverty rates
Financial Crisis Average over all countries
Baltic country Liberal market economy
Eastern European economy Continental European economy
Mediterranean Economy Social democratic countries
0.
13
2
0.
13
4
0.
13
6
0.
13
8
0.
14
0
Po
ve
rty
 ra
te
−
10
−
5
0
5
G
DP
 g
ro
wt
h 
ra
te
2005 2007 2009 2011 2013
Year
Financial crisis GDP growth rate Poverty rate
Average GDP growth vs. poverty rates across countries
Notes: This graph displays real GDP growth rates as well as poverty rates for different country groups in the
EU-SILC data. We group countries according to Aristei & Perugini (2015), see Table A.1 for a detailed overview
on the classification. Real GDP growth rate is calculated as the percentage change of real GDP with respect to the
previous year, poverty rates is the fraction of people in each year whose disposable household income is below
60% of the median equivalized disposable household income in the respective year. The shaded areas indicate the
big financial crisis spanning the years 2008 and 2009.
Source: Real GDP growth data are retrieved from Eurostat (2017b), poverty rates are our own calculations based
on EU-SILC data.
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FIGURE A.2 — Average adjusted poverty entry and exit rates over time relative to the crisis.
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Notes: This graph depicts average entry rates (left axis) and exit rates (right axis) which are regression-adjusted
for age and gender against time, relative to the years of the crisis (t = 0 are the years 2008 and 2009).
FIGURE A.3 — Kaplan Meier estimates of survival and failure probability.
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Notes: These graphs display Kaplan Meier survival estimates for individuals who are currently in a poverty spell
(left graph) and failure estimates for individuals currently in a non-poverty spell (right graph). On the horizontal
axis is time in years, either after poverty entry (left graph) or in non-poverty (right graph).
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FIGURE A.4 — Predicted conditional poverty entry and exit hazard rates.
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Notes: This graph displays the predicted cloglog-transformed conditional poverty entry and exit hazard rate for
each period k = {1,2,3} in non-poverty and poverty, respectively. Predictions are based on models 1 and 3 in
Table A.3 which do not include control variables. In case an individual has multiple spells J > 1 in the data, we
use the average hazard rate for each period k over its Ji spells.
FIGURE A.5 — Average adjusted difference of people entering and exiting poverty over time relative to
the crisis.
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Notes: This graph plots the average distance between total equivalized household income and the poverty threshold
at 60% of the median equivalized household income in Euros for individuals that are at risk of entering or exiting
poverty against time, relative to the years of the crisis (t = 0 are the years 2008 and 2009).
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B. WEB APPENDIX
This Web Appendix (not for publication) provides additional material discussed in
the unpublished manuscript ‘Poverty in Times of Crisis’ by Alexander Ahammer
and Stefan Kranzinger.
TABLE B.1 — Average equivalized disposable household incomes.
Individuals at risk of poverty entry or exit
At risk of entry At risk of exit
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Obs. Mean Std. dev.
Pre-crisis 1,397,621 31,804.64 (35,567.1) 46,499 10,086.69 (18,142.0)
Crisis 954,392 32,599.70 (30,876.9) 42,904 9,504.18 (21,729.9)
Post-crisis 2,428,504 33,154.61 (30,905.0) 107,447 10,141.66 (10,478.7)
Individuals experiencing entry or exit event
Entry event Exit event
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Obs. Mean Std. dev.
Pre-crisis 61,964 21,123.02 (55,989.3) 14,216 10,689.90 (28,522.6)
Crisis 37,119 21,751.41 (31,190.6) 11,528 10,845.66 (12,808.1)
Post-crisis 73,784 21,394.32 (21,598.4) 21,124 11,387.42 (12,438.2)
Notes: This table summarizes averages of total equivalized disposable household income (equiv-
alized using the OECD-modified weighting scheme) by crisis period (pre-crisis, during crisis,
post-crisis) for individuals that are either at risk of experiencing a target event (entry or exit), and
individuals who in fact experience a target event.
32
TABLE B.2 — Unconditional entry and exit rates.
Entry probabilities Exit probabilities
Spell length At risk Prob. Std. err. At risk Prob. Std. err.
Overall
1 1,868,558 0.058 (0.23) 147,899 0.274 (0.45)
2 1,396,886 0.031 (0.17) 37,238 0.162 (0.37)
3 903,195 0.022 (0.15) 10,990 0.017 (0.13)
Pre-crisis
1 720,456 0.059 (0.24) 38,714 0.333 (0.47)
2 422,605 0.035 (0.18) 6,825 0.188 (0.39)
3 203,309 0.021 (0.14) 995 0.043 (0.20)
Crisis
1 343,834 0.062 (0.24) 31,749 0.308 (0.46)
2 263,156 0.038 (0.19) 8,420 0.197 (0.40)
3 195,396 0.028 (0.16) 2,573 0.024 (0.15)
Post-crisis
1 804,268 0.056 (0.23) 77,436 0.231 (0.42)
2 711,125 0.026 (0.16) 21,993 0.140 (0.35)
3 504,490 0.019 (0.14) 7,422 0.011 (0.10)
Notes: Estimates of unconditional entry and exit hazard rates for different non-
poverty and poverty spell lengths. In panels ‘Pre-crisis’, ‘Crisis’, and ‘Post-crisis’
the sample is stratified to spells that end before, during, or after the big financial
crisis, respectively.
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TABLE B.3 — Summary statistics for people at risk of entering or exiting poverty.
Persons at risk to enter/exit poverty Persons who experience entry or exit event
Persons entering poverty Persons exiting poverty Persons entering poverty Persons exiting poverty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Before During After Before During After Before During After Before During After
T 1.70 (0.85) 2.19 (1.14) 2.26 (1.20) 1.19 (0.44) 1.33 (0.61) 1.36 (0.66) 1.39 (0.64) 1.59 (0.79) 1.56 (0.81) 1.10 (0.30) 1.16 (0.40) 1.16 (0.42)
Exit probability 0.31 (0.46) 0.27 (0.44) 0.20 (0.40)
Entry probability 0.04 (0.21) 0.04 (0.19) 0.03 (0.17)
Individual-level characteristics
Female 0.42 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49) 0.43 (0.50) 0.41 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49) 0.40 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49) 0.43 (0.49) 0.45 (0.50) 0.43 (0.50)
Has permanent job 0.27 (0.45) 0.27 (0.45) 0.38 (0.48) 0.10 (0.30) 0.10 (0.31) 0.21 (0.41) 0.13 (0.33) 0.14 (0.34) 0.24 (0.43) 0.14 (0.35) 0.15 (0.36) 0.24 (0.43)
Retired 0.01 (0.10) 0.10 (0.30) 0.21 (0.41) 0.01 (0.10) 0.09 (0.29) 0.15 (0.36) 0.01 (0.10) 0.07 (0.26) 0.17 (0.37) 0.01 (0.11) 0.10 (0.30) 0.17 (0.37)
Has chronic disease 0.20 (0.40) 0.21 (0.41) 0.23 (0.42) 0.23 (0.42) 0.25 (0.43) 0.24 (0.43) 0.24 (0.43) 0.24 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43) 0.22 (0.42) 0.26 (0.44) 0.25 (0.43)
Has physical limitation 0.16 (0.37) 0.17 (0.38) 0.18 (0.39) 0.20 (0.40) 0.22 (0.41) 0.20 (0.40) 0.21 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41) 0.19 (0.39) 0.23 (0.42) 0.20 (0.40)
Owns dwelling 0.80 (0.40) 0.77 (0.42) 0.05 (0.21) 0.69 (0.46) 0.71 (0.46) 0.09 (0.29) 0.71 (0.45) 0.70 (0.46) 0.07 (0.25) 0.72 (0.45) 0.72 (0.45) 0.09 (0.28)
Age categories
Age < 25 0.12 (0.32) 0.11 (0.32) 0.10 (0.31) 0.12 (0.33) 0.12 (0.32) 0.13 (0.33) 0.13 (0.34) 0.13 (0.34) 0.13 (0.34) 0.14 (0.35) 0.12 (0.33) 0.14 (0.34)
25 ≤ age < 35 0.12 (0.33) 0.12 (0.32) 0.11 (0.31) 0.09 (0.29) 0.09 (0.29) 0.10 (0.30) 0.11 (0.31) 0.11 (0.31) 0.11 (0.31) 0.11 (0.31) 0.10 (0.30) 0.11 (0.31)
35 ≤ age < 50 0.42 (0.49) 0.40 (0.49) 0.38 (0.49) 0.46 (0.50) 0.44 (0.50) 0.45 (0.50) 0.42 (0.49) 0.43 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49) 0.43 (0.50) 0.40 (0.49) 0.41 (0.49)
50 ≤ age < 65 0.20 (0.40) 0.21 (0.41) 0.22 (0.41) 0.16 (0.36) 0.17 (0.37) 0.18 (0.39) 0.16 (0.37) 0.18 (0.38) 0.19 (0.39) 0.17 (0.38) 0.19 (0.39) 0.19 (0.40)
Age ≥ 65 0.15 (0.35) 0.16 (0.37) 0.18 (0.39) 0.17 (0.38) 0.19 (0.39) 0.14 (0.35) 0.18 (0.38) 0.15 (0.36) 0.15 (0.36) 0.15 (0.35) 0.19 (0.39) 0.15 (0.36)
Marital status
Never married 0.23 (0.42) 0.23 (0.42) 0.23 (0.42) 0.22 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41) 0.24 (0.43) 0.23 (0.42) 0.24 (0.43) 0.25 (0.43) 0.24 (0.43) 0.23 (0.42) 0.25 (0.43)
Married 0.46 (0.50) 0.47 (0.50) 0.47 (0.50) 0.35 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48) 0.35 (0.48) 0.40 (0.49) 0.41 (0.49) 0.39 (0.49) 0.39 (0.49) 0.40 (0.49) 0.39 (0.49)
Separated 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.09) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.12) 0.02 (0.13) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.11)
Widowed 0.06 (0.23) 0.06 (0.24) 0.07 (0.25) 0.09 (0.29) 0.10 (0.30) 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.28) 0.07 (0.26) 0.07 (0.26) 0.08 (0.27) 0.10 (0.30) 0.08 (0.28)
Divorced 0.04 (0.19) 0.04 (0.20) 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.22) 0.06 (0.23) 0.05 (0.22) 0.05 (0.22) 0.06 (0.23) 0.04 (0.21) 0.06 (0.23) 0.06 (0.23)
Missing 0.20 (0.40) 0.19 (0.39) 0.18 (0.38) 0.28 (0.45) 0.26 (0.44) 0.26 (0.44) 0.23 (0.42) 0.22 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41) 0.23 (0.42) 0.20 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40)
Highest educational level achieved
Pre-primary 0.01 (0.08) 0.01 (0.08) 0.01 (0.08) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.12) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.11) 0.01 (0.09)
Primary 0.11 (0.31) 0.09 (0.29) 0.08 (0.28) 0.16 (0.37) 0.15 (0.36) 0.12 (0.32) 0.17 (0.37) 0.15 (0.35) 0.12 (0.33) 0.15 (0.36) 0.14 (0.35) 0.11 (0.32)
Lower secondary 0.16 (0.36) 0.16 (0.37) 0.16 (0.37) 0.19 (0.39) 0.21 (0.41) 0.20 (0.40) 0.20 (0.40) 0.22 (0.41) 0.21 (0.41) 0.19 (0.39) 0.21 (0.41) 0.21 (0.40)
Upper secondary 0.33 (0.47) 0.34 (0.47) 0.34 (0.47) 0.25 (0.43) 0.27 (0.44) 0.29 (0.45) 0.27 (0.45) 0.29 (0.45) 0.31 (0.46) 0.30 (0.46) 0.30 (0.46) 0.33 (0.47)
Post-secondary 0.03 (0.17) 0.03 (0.16) 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.15) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.15) 0.02 (0.15) 0.02 (0.14) 0.03 (0.16) 0.03 (0.16) 0.02 (0.15)
Tertiary 0.37 (0.48) 0.37 (0.48) 0.39 (0.49) 0.36 (0.48) 0.34 (0.47) 0.36 (0.48) 0.32 (0.47) 0.32 (0.47) 0.32 (0.47) 0.33 (0.47) 0.31 (0.46) 0.32 (0.47)
Household-level characteristics
Equiv. household size 2.05 (0.63) 2.03 (0.63) 2.00 (0.63) 1.99 (0.75) 1.97 (0.76) 2.02 (0.75) 2.09 (0.73) 2.11 (0.72) 2.10 (0.73) 2.09 (0.72) 2.02 (0.74) 2.05 (0.71)
Number of children 0.66 (0.97) 0.61 (0.94) 0.65 (1.06) 0.76 (1.13) 0.73 (1.11) 0.98 (1.54) 0.83 (1.15) 0.81 (1.13) 0.84 (1.22) 0.81 (1.10) 0.72 (1.05) 0.87 (1.27)
Densely pop. area 0.36 (0.48) 0.35 (0.48) 0.35 (0.48) 0.34 (0.47) 0.32 (0.46) 0.32 (0.47) 0.33 (0.47) 0.32 (0.46) 0.32 (0.47) 0.32 (0.47) 0.33 (0.47) 0.33 (0.47)
log(imputed rend) 6.76 (3.00) 6.89 (2.75) 6.91 (2.70) 6.52 (3.09) 6.25 (2.99) 6.21 (3.02) 6.37 (3.19) 6.45 (2.95) 6.30 (2.98) 6.52 (3.12) 6.48 (2.91) 6.41 (2.94)
Observations 1397623 954392 2428504 46534 42909 107447 61964 37119 73784 14228 11533 21124
Notes: This table displays sample means of all variables included in the regressions.
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TABLE B.4 — Effect of financial crisis on poverty transitions (fixed-effects panel logit model).
Poverty transitions
(1) (2)
Crisis indicators (reference category: before crisis)
During crisis 0.789*** (0.04) 0.615*** (0.04)
After crisis 0.668*** (0.04) 0.386*** (0.02)
Individual-level characteristics
Has permanent job 0.493*** (0.01)
Retired 0.795*** (0.01)
Has chronic disease 0.978** (0.01)
Has physical limitation 1.014 (0.01)
Owns dwelling 0.953** (0.02)
Age category (reference category: 35 ≤ age < 50)
Age < 25 1.406*** (0.03)
25 ≤ age < 35 0.971 (0.02)
50 ≤ age < 65 0.741*** (0.01)
Age ≥ 65 0.494*** (0.01)
Marital status (reference category: married)‡
Never married 1.376*** (0.03)
Separated 1.515*** (0.05)
Widowed 1.953*** (0.05)
Divorced 1.408*** (0.04)
Household-level characteristics
Equivalized household size 0.558*** (0.01)
Number of children in household 0.994 (0.00)
Densely populated area 1.041* (0.02)
log(imputed rent) 0.977*** (0.00)
log(imputed rent) × owns dwelling 0.991*** (0.00)
Country-level characteristics
log(GDP) 2.010*** (0.11)
Unemployment rate 1.030*** (0.00)
Individual fixed-effects Yes Yes
Year fixed-effects Yes Yes
Log-likelihood –334,110.9 –325,415.9
Number of observations 905,123 905,123
Number of individuals 268,813 268,813
Notes: In this table we report results obtained from performing a conditional logit fixed effects estimation
(Wooldridge 2010) with poverty as the outcome variable. Following Correia (2015), we drop observa-
tions for whom the value of the respective outcome variable never changes during the observation period
prior to performing the estimation in order to improve computational efficiency. Observations who never
change their poverty status have been dropped before the regression. Coefficients are exponentiated and
can be interpreted as odds ratios, individual-level clustered standard errors are given in parentheses next
to coefficients. Stars indicate significance levels: * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
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TABLE B.5 — Robustness check: Effect of financial crisis on poverty entry and exit hazards, including
a 10% band around the poverty threshold (discrete time mixed proportional hazards models).
Poverty entry hazard Poverty exit hazard
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Crisis indicators (reference category: before crisis)
During crisis 1.119*** (0.01) 1.167*** (0.01) 0.878*** (0.01) 0.872*** (0.01)
After crisis 0.889*** (0.01) 0.881*** (0.01) 0.647*** (0.01) 0.696*** (0.01)
Duration dependence
exp(δ1) 0.035*** (0.00) 46.462*** (6.53) 0.294*** (0.00) 0.146*** (0.04)
exp(δ2) 0.018*** (0.00) 25.278*** (3.56) 0.154*** (0.00) 0.075*** (0.02)
exp(δ3) 0.013*** (0.00) 18.909*** (2.67) 0.013*** (0.00) 0.006*** (0.00)
exp(ξ2) 1.150*** (0.03) 0.931** (0.03) 0.216*** (0.01) 0.201*** (0.02)
Other covariatesa No Yes No Yes
σˆη 0.4880 0.5156 0.4384 0.3360
ρˆ 0.1265 0.4726 0.1046 0.0642
Log-likelihood –495,783.7 –474,342.1 –89,582.4 –87,321.71
Number of observations 4,168,000 4,168,000 196,021 196,021
Number of individuals 1,817,479 1,817,479 143,444 143,444
Notes: This table reports the difference in poverty entry and exit hazard rates depending on whether the person was at
risk during or after the big financial crisis, as compared to before. Poverty entries are only considered as such if post-
entry income is below a 10% band around the poverty threshold. Likewise, exits are only considered as such if post-exit
income is above a 10% band around the threshold. Coefficients are exponentiated and can be interpreted as hazard ratios,
individual-level clustered standard errors are given in parentheses next to coefficients. Stars indicate significance levels:
* p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
aWe control for gender, occupation, health proxies, dwelling type, age, marital status, education, household size, number
of children, type of neighborhood, GDP, and unemployment rate (a detailed overview on our control variables is provided
in section III). Additionally, we include missing indicator dummies for education and marital status.
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TABLE B.6 — Robustness check: Effect of financial crisis on poverty exit hazards, including left-
censored observations and using a geometric distribution of the baseline hazard (discrete time mixed
proportional hazards models).
(1) (2) (3)
Baseline Full sample Geometric BH
Crisis indicators (reference category: before crisis)
During crisis 0.935*** (0.01) 0.943*** (0.01) 0.946*** (0.01)
After crisis 0.686*** (0.01) 0.734*** (0.01) 0.740*** (0.01)
Duration dependence
exp(δ1) 0.165*** (0.04) 0.325*** (0.04)
exp(δ2) 0.091*** (0.02) 0.187*** (0.02)
exp(δ3) 0.009*** (0.00) 0.135*** (0.02)
exp(ξ2) 0.244*** (0.01) 0.450*** (0.01) 0.430*** (0.01)
T 0.622*** (0.00)
Other covariatesa Yes Yes Yes
σˆη 0.0247 0.0002 0.1063
ρˆ 0.0004 0.0000 0.0068
Log-likelihood –28,691.1 876,290.4 –390,583.6
Number of observations 196,021 768,772 768,772
Number of individuals 143,444 444,168 444,168
Notes: This table presents results of reestimating the model in Table A.3, column (4), on
different samples and with a different specification of the baseline hazard, for the purpose
of analyzing the extent to which our estimates change when we use different methods to
account for left-censoring (Iceland 1997). Column (1) gives again the baseline estimates for
comparison, in column (2) we keep left-censored observations instead of dropping them as
done for our main exit hazard estimations, and in column (3) we assume that the baseline
hazard is constant over time. Coefficients are exponentiated and can be interpreted as hazard
ratios, individual-level clustered standard errors are given in parentheses next to coefficients.
Stars indicate significance levels: * p< 0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
aWe control for gender, occupation, health proxies, dwelling type, age, marital status, edu-
cation, household size, number of children, type of neighborhood, GDP, and unemployment
rate (a detailed overview on our control variables is provided in section III). Additionally,
we include missing indicator dummies for education, occupation, and marital status.
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